Technological progress takes the form of improvements in quality of an array of intermediate inputs to production. In an equilibrium that is standard in the literature, all research is carried out by outsiders, and success means that the outsider replaces the incumbent as the industry leader. The equilibrium research intensity involves three considerations: leading-edge goods are priced above the competitive level, innovators value the extraction of monopoly rents from predecessors, and innovators regard their successes as temporary. We show that, if industry leaders have lower costs of research, then the leaders will do all the research in equilibrium.
Some recent contributions to the endogenous-growth literature model technological progress as either an increase in the number of types of products (Romer [1990] , Grossman and Helpman [1991, Ch. 3]) or an improvement in the quality of products (Aghion and Howitt [1992] , Grossman and Helpman [1991, Ch. 4fl . We can think of increases in the number of types, N, as basic innovations that amount to dramatically new kinds of goods or methods of production. In contrast, increases in the quality or productivity of the existing goods involve a continuing series of improvements and refinements of products and techniques. Figure 1 shows the basic setup. We consider intermediate inputs, as in Ethier (1982) and Romer (1990) , and assume that these come in N varieties, arrayed along the horizontal axis. In models of expanding variety, N can increase over time, but we treat N as fixed in the present analysis. The leading-edge quality of each type of intermediate good is currently at the level shown on the vertical axis. We specify later the precise meaning of the ladder numbers indicated on this axis. Since the process of quality improvement turns out to occur at different rates (and in a random manner), the figure shows that the levels currently attained vary in an irregular way across the sectors.
For analyses of basic innovation, a common assumption is that the new types of intermediate inputs do not interact directly with the old ones. In particular, Romer (1990) uses the Spence (1976) /Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) functional form in which inputs enter into the production function in an additively separable manner. This specification turns out to imply that the introduction of a new kind of good does not tend to make any old goods obsolete. (Young [1993] takes a different approach, in which the newly discovered goods are complements of some existing goods and substitutes for others.)
In contrast, when a product or technique is improved, the new good or method tends to displace the old one. That is, it is natural to model different quality grades for a good of a given type as close substitutes. We follow Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Cli. 4) and make the extreme assumption that the different qualities of a particular type of intermediate input are perfect substitutes; hence, the discovery of a higher grade turns out to drive out completely the lower grades. For this reason, successful researchers along the quality dimension tend to eliminate the monopoly rentals of their predecessors, the process of "creative destruction" described by Schumpeter (1942) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . This feature of the quality-improvement model is the key distinction from the models of expanding variety, as formulated by Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3).
A. Sketch of the Mode! Before we get into the technical details, we provide a sketch of the structure of the Improvements build on the currently best technology and derive from efforts by researchers. A successful researcher retains exclusive rights over the use of his or her improved intermediate good.
At each point in time, the knowledge exists to produce an array of qualities of each type of intermediate good. In the equilibrium, however, oxily the leading-edge quality is actually produced in each sector and used by final-goods producers to generate output.
The researcher who has a monopoly over the use of the latest technology receives a flow of profit We begin with a standard model in which the latest innovator is a different person from the previous innovator, so that a research success terminates the predecessor's flow of profit. Therefore, in considering how much resources to devote to research, entrepreneurs consider the size of the profit flow and its likely duration. This duration is random, becauseit depends on the uncertain outcomes from the research efforts by competitors.
The temporary nature of an inventor's monopoly position brings in two important considerations: first, the shorter the expected duration of the monopoly the smaller the anticipated payoff from R&D, a distortion because the advances are permanent from a social perspective, and, second, part of the reward from successful research is the creative-destruction effect that involves the transfer of monopoly rentals from the incumbent innovator to the newcomer. Since this transfer has no social value, this second force constitutes an excessive incentive for R&D. We show that the second element is larger than the first, because the two terms are basically the same, except that the second element comes earlier in time. Hence, the net effect is an increase in the private return from research relative to the social return.
In a later section, we assume that the industry leader has a cost advantage in research. If the cost advantage is large enough, then the leader carries out all the research; in particular, the leader regards innovations as permanent and does not give any credit for the expropriation of his or her own monopoly rentals. If the leader's cost advantage in research is smaller, then the leader still carries out all the research in equilibrium, but the intensity of this research is the amount required to deter entry by outsiders. The rate of return and growth rate then turn out to coincide with the values that prevail when research is done by outsiders. We comment at the end about implications for policy. arrayed along a quality ladder with rungs spaced proportionately at interval q>1.' We normalize so that each good begins-when first invented-at quality 1. The subsequent rungs are at the levels q, q2, and so on. Thus, if improvements in quality have occurred in sector j, then the available grades in the sector are 1, q, ..., (q)k
Increases in the quality of goods available in a sector-that is, rises in c-resu1t from the successful application of research effort, to be described later. These improvements must occur sequentially, one rung at a time.
Let Xjjk be the quantity used by the ith firm of the jth type of intermediate good of quality rung k. The rung k corresponds to quality qk, so that k=O refers to quality 1, k=1 to quality q, and so on. Thus, if is the highest quality level available in sector j, then the quality-adjusted input from this sector is given by 'ci (2) X1 = (qk.X..) 1This setup follows the models of Aghion and I-fowitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4) , except that we follow Romer (1990) in modeling the goods as intermediate inputs to production, rather than final products.
The assumption in equation (2) is that the quality grades within a sector are perfect substitutes as inputs to production. The overall input from a sector, X, is therefore the quality-weighted sum of the amounts used of each grade, In models of expanding variety, such as Romer (1990) , Ic=O applies in each sector, and technological advances arise in equation (1) from increases in N. Since N is fixed here, we are assuming implicitly that all of the edsting types of intermediate goods were discovered sometime in the (distant) past. But we allow to evolve over time in each sector in response to the R&D effort aimed at quality improvement in that sector. Figure 2 shows a possible path for the evolution of the leading-edge quality in sector j. The best quality available equals 1 at time t0, rises to q (rung 1) at time t1, to q2 (rung 2) at time t2, to qk (rung k) at time tk, and soon. Thus, tk+l_tk is the interval over which the best quality is q1' for k = The figure shows intervals of differing length for each value of k; these lengths are random in the model developed The intermediate good is nondurable and entails a unit marginal .cost of production (in terms of output, Y). That is, the cost of production is the same for au qualities where k = 0,... ,tc. Thus, the latest innovator has an efficiency advantage over the prior 2Since this model does not consider the initial discovery of a type of product, we have to assume that goods of quality 1 (rung 0) can be produced by anyone. The treatment of these lowest quality goods will not be an issue if substantial quality improvements have already occurred in each sector.
innovators in the sector, but will eventually be at a disadvantage relative to future innovators.
Suppose for the moment that only the best existing quality of intermediate good j-with quality level (q)3-is available currently for production. (The other grades will turn out not to be used in equilibrium.) The marginal product of this good can be computed from equations (1) and (2) as
If units of the leading-edge good are priced at P and if no other quality grades of good j are available, then the implied demand function (from the aggregate of profitmaximizing final-goods producers) can be written as
=
The leading-edge producer acts as a monopolist in this environment, and profit maximization leads to the markup formula, = LA ''-
I\ •(q)
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The evolution of over time in each sector and the divergences of the across the sectors will lead to variations in X over time and across sectors.
Suppose now that goods from quality rungs below are also available for production in sector j. We assume in this section that the a'cth innovator, who has the rights to produce the best known quality, was not also the (ec-1)th innovator, who can produce the next best quality. If the leading-edge producer charges the monopoly price shown in equation (5) and if this price is high enough, then the producer of the next lowest grade will be able to make positive profits by producing.
Recall from equation (2) that the different quality grades are perfect substitutes, but are weighted by their respective grades. Thus, each unit of the leading-edge good is equivalent to q>1 units of the next best good. It follows that if the highest grade is priced at P, then a good of the next lowest grade could be sold at most at the price (1/q).Pj,ç, the one below that at the price (1/2)-P and so on. If (1/q)Pj,ç is less then the unit marginal cost of production, then the next best grade (and, moreover, all of the lower quality grades) cannot survive.
Equation (5) shows that the leading-edge producer's monopoly price is 1/a, a price that would allow the next best producer to price at most at l/(aq), the one below that at 1/(aq2), and so on, If 1/(aq) is less than one, then the next best producer (and all lower quality producers) cannot compete against the leader's monopoly price.
Therefore, the condition aq>1 implies that monopoly pricing will prevail. This inequality will hold if q, the spacing between quality improvements, is large enough; the lower grades are then immediately driven out of the market even though the leading good is priced at the monopoly level. In this case, only the best available quality, of 8 each type of intermediate good is produced and used as an input by final-goods producers. The price and quantity of type j are then given by equations (5) and (6).
If aq<1, then we can follow Grossman and llelpman (1991, Ch. 4) by assuming that the providers of intermediate goods of a given type engage in Bertrand price competition. In this case, the quality leader employs a limit-pricing strategy, that is, the leader sets a price that is sufficiently below the monopoly price so as to make it just barely unprofitable for the next best quality to be produced.3 This limit price is given by (7) limit pricing = = q.
If the leader prices at q-c, where eis an arbitrarily small positive amount, then the producer of the next best quality can charge at most 1 -/q, a price that results in negative profit, The lower quality goods are therefore again driven out of the market.
A comparison of equations (7) and (5) shows that, if aq<1-the condition for limit pricing to prevail-then the limit price is no larger than the monopoly price.
The total quantity produced (of the highest quality) when limit pricing applies is given by (8) limit pricing
3Grossman and 1'lelpmari (1991, Ch. 4) effectively assume a=O, so that the magnitude of the elasticity of demand is 1, and the monopoly price shown in equation (5) is infinite. Since the inequality aq l must hold in this situation monopoly pricing cannot apply in their model.
A comparison of equations (8) and (6) shows that, if aqcl, then the quantity produced under limit pricing is larger than the amount that would have been produced under monopoly.
The monopoly formulas in equations (5) and (6) apply if aql, and the limitpricing formulas in equations (7) and (8) (5) and (6) apply. The main results are similar, however, if &q<1, so that limit pricing prevails.
We can use the results to rewrite the production function from equation (1) as If we substitute the quantity X from equation (6) We can define an aggregate quality index,
The index Q is a combination of the various ,c's, and increases in the ic-'s affect aggregate output to the extent that they raise Q.
We also note from aggregation of equation (6) across the sectors that total spending on intermediates, denoted by X, is proportional to Q:
We now consider the determinants of changes in the a'c's.
The Incentive to Innovate a. The Flow of Monopoly Profit
Innovation in a sector takes the form of an improvement in quality by the multiple ic-i tc.
q. The ,c.th innovator in sector j raises the quality from q to q . This innovator will be able to price in accordance with equation (5) potential innovators in sector j when the highest quality-ladder number reached in that sector is 'ci. The higher the larger the probability, p, per unit of time of a successful innovation, that is, an increase in the ladder number from to ic+l.
Specifically, we assume
so that, for given the probability of success is proportional to the overall research effort, We assume also that the probability of success declines for given effort 3 with the complexity of the project, represented by the ladder number, 'ci, that is,
The randomness of R&D success implies that progress will occur unevenly in a single sector; usually nothing happens, but on rare occasions the productivity jumps by a discrete amount. We assume, however, that individual sectors are small and that the probabilities of research success across sectors are independent. The Law of Large Numbers then implies that the jumpiness in microeconomic outcomes is not transmitted to the macroeconomic variables: the adding up across a large number of independent sectors N leads to a smooth path for the aggregate quality index Q, shown in equation (11), and therefore for aggregate economic growth. (This result would be exact if we 4The linearity in Z. means that the marginal contribution of R&D effort to the probability of success, Op/OZ. ,equals the average contribution, p/Z. That is, the research process is not being modeled as a congestible resource, like a fishing pond, in which an individual's expected return declines with the aggregate level of investment. For this reason, a researcher is indifferent to entry by additional researchers or to changes in the effort levef by his or her competitors. The model therefore does not have the property of some patentrace formulations in which-for congestion reasons-the overall level of research tends to be too high from a social perspective (see Reinganum [1989] for a survey of these models).
treated N as continuous, that is, if sectors were of infinitesimal size.) Thus, the analysis abstracts from the aggregate fluctuations that are the focus of real business-cycle models.6
Define G(r) to be the cumulative probability density function for Tj,ç The derivative of G (r) is (17) dG/dr = where we assume that p is constant over the interval, (t,ct,c+j) In other words, the research effort, Z, and, hence, the probability of success, p, do not vary over time between innovations in a sector. (These conditions hold in equilibrium.) Since P/c is ii constant over time, we can readily solve the differential equation (17). If we use the boundary condition, G(O)=O, then the result is
The probability density function can then be found from differentiation of the cumulative density:
5We could get similar results for aggregate growth if we assumed that innovation occurred deterrninistically in a single sector, that is, the application of a given level of R&D effort generated a quality improvement after a known interval of time. The aggregation would then depend, however, on how the R&D effort and, hence, the innovations were synchronized across the sectors. The framework with a Poisson success probability in each sector is much more manageable.
We can use equations (15) and (18) to compute the expected present value of profit, evaluated at time tK:
f_e_1T).exp(_p,j). dr =
If we substitute for from equation (14), then we get • LA1. (!).
We assume free entry into the research business. Hence, if Z>0 then fl=O must hold. The term then cancels out in equation (20), and the free-entry condition with positive R&D can be written as
Note that the right-hand side depends on c, but does not differ otherwise across sectors.
Equation (21) implies that the probability of innovation would generally vary with (tc.+1). a/U-a) because of two offsetting effects. The term q appears because the expected reward from an innovation is increasing in (see equation [19] ). This effect arises because the quantity of intermediates sold (equation [6] ) increases with quality and, hence, with The second effect reflects the assumption that innovations in a sector are increasingly difficult, that is, If the first effect dominates, then the rate of return to R&D is higher the more advanced a sector. The more advanced sectors will then tend to grow faster than less advanced sectors, and the growth rate of the overall economy will rise over time as the average value of increases. In other words, R&D features a form of increasing returns, and this property creates a pattern of divergence for growth rates.
In contrast, if the second effect dominates, then more advanced sectors will tend to grow relatively slowly, and the growth rate of the overall economy will fall over time.
In this case, R&D exhibits a form of decreasing returns, and this relation generates the kind of convergence behavior that appears in the neoclassical growth model (see Barro and SaIa4-Martin [1992] ).
Finally, if the two forces exactly offset, then all sectors will tend to grow at the same rate, and the growth rate of the overall economy will be constant over time. In this case, R&D exhibits constant returns. This case therefore features endogenous, steady-state growth of the sort that arises in models with constant returns to a broad concept of capital (Rebelo [19911) . We focus the subsequent discussion on this case, that is, we deal with the situation in which rates of return to R&D are constant.
Equation (21) shows that the balance between the two forces depends on the form of Ø(tc). A specification that makes the two effects exactly offset is
where the parameter (>0 represents the cost of research. A higher (lowers the probability of success for given values of and in equation (16).
The term on the far right-hand side of equation (22) If we substitute from equation (22) into equation (21), then the free-entry condition becomes
where we substituted p=p,1 because the probability is constant7 (across sectors and over time in a given sector)) The right-hand side of equation (23) represents the rate of return from research (the expected flow of profit per unit of research effort). The key, however, is that a successful researcher maintains this return only until the time of the next innovation. The rate of return must therefore cover the ordinary rate of return, r, plus the premium for the probability, p, per unit of time that a competitor will succeed and thereby drive the incumbent out of business.
Equation (23) implies that the probability of an innovation per unit of time is
If r is constant over time, then p is also constant (as well as the same for all sectors).
The amount of resources devoted to R&D in sector j is Hence, more advanced sectors-with higher tc-have a larger quantity of research devoted to them. The probability of success is, however, independent of because equation (22) implies that correspondingly more effort is required in a more advanced sector to generate the same probability.
The aggregate of R&D spending, denoted by Z, is
where Q is the aggregate quality index, as shown in equation (11). Hence, Z is proportional to Q for a given value of r.
The Behavior of the Aggregate Quality Index
The level of aggregate output, Y in equation (12), the aggregate resources expended on intermediates, X in equation (13), and the total expenditure on R&D, Z in equation (26), are all constant multiples of the aggregate quality index, Q. (We assume here that r is constant, a condition that will hold in equilibrium.) Hence, the growth rates of these quantities are all equal to the growth rate of Q:
where the symbol denotes the growth rate of the variable designated by the subscript.
To understand growth in this model, we have to explain the changes over time in Q.
Recall the definition of Q from equation (11): ic.a/(1-a) (11)
3='
In sector j, the term q '.
does not change if no innovation occurs, but rises to (tc.+l)-a/(l-a) q in the case of a research success. The proportionate change in this term due to a success is qaI(1 -1, and the probability per unit of time of a success is the value p shown in equation (24). Since p is the same for all sectors, the expected proportionate change in Q per unit of time is given by (27) E(Q/Q) = p.(qa/(1) -1).
Tithe number of sectors, N, is large, then the Law of Large Numbers implies that the average growth rate of Q measured over any finite interval of time will he close to the expression shown on the right-hand side of equation (27) . We assume, in particular, that N is large enough to treat Q as differentiable, with Q/Q non-stochastic and equal to the right-hand side of equation (27). (This result holds exactly if N approaches infinity, and the size of each sector tends to zero.) If we substitute for p from equation (24), then we get the growth rate of Q:
.
[qtY/(1-a)
Equation ( [22)). Note that the more advanced a sector-the higher K-the greater is the market value of the leading-edge firm.
The aggregate market value of firms, denoted by V, is the sum of equation (29) over the N sectors:
The total market value of firms is therefore a constant multiple of Q.
C. Households and Market Equilibrium
We assume that each household maximizes a familiar expression for utility over an 20 infinite horizon:
where c is consumption per person, the rate of population growth is zero, 0>0 is the constant elasticity of maiginal utility with respect to c, and p>0 is the rate of time preference. Households earn the rate of return r on assets and receive the wage rate w (equal to the marginal product of labor) on the fixed aggregate quantity L of labor. In a dosed economy, the total of households' assets equals the market value of firms, (Q, as shown in equation (30).9 The key condition that we need from household optimization is the standard one for the growth rate of consumption:
where C is aggregate consumption.
To apply the result in equation (32), we have to use our previous analysis to derive an expression for C, the level of consumption. The economy's overall resource constraint is C = Y -X9The wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, which can be computed from equation (1). We can use this condition to show that the households' aggregate income, wL+rCQ, equals a concept of net product that takes account of capital losses, Y-X-p(Q, where X is aggregate spending on intermediates (equation [131) and p(Q is the capital loss from destruction of the market value of superseded innovations. Household saving, (Q, equals income less consumption, Y-X-p(Q-C. The economy's resource constraint is Y=C+X+Z, where Z is aggregate spending on R&D. Household saving therefore equals Z-p(Q, that is, net investment equals R&D spending less the capital loss due to destruction of existing market value.
where Y is. given in equation (12); X is given in equation (13) The variables Y, X, Z, C, and Q all grow at the same rate, which we can denote by . Equation (28), which derived from the behavior of firms as producers, gives one expression for ' as a function of r. Equation (32), which came from the behavior of households as consumers, provides another expression for 7 as a function of r. In a market equilibrium, the value of r is such as to equate the two expressions for the growth rate. The resulting values of r and 7 axe constants and therefore constitute the steady-state values. The solutions are 
+ . [qa/(l-a)_1]
We assume that the parameters are such that is positive (so that the free-entry condition in equation 121] actually holds with equality), and r> applies (to satisfy the LOThe transversality condition, r> 7 in the following, ensures that the expression for C in equation (33) is positive. transversality condition)." Equation (27) implies that the equilibrium value of p is the expression for 7 in equation (35) Kremer (1993) argues that this hypothesis may be correct.
D. Innovation by the Leader
The results predict a continual leapfrogging in leadership positions in an industry.
Since the incumbent does no research, he or she is replaced on top at the time of the '3Because of this effect, the economy does not tend toward a steady state with constant percapita growth if we allow for growth in population L, at a positive rate. next quality improvement by an outside competitor, who is subsequently replaced by another outsider, and soon.
In the real world, most improvements in the quality of existing products seem to be made by industry leaders. This outcome likely arises because the leaders typically have the best information about the current technology and other advantages that effectively reduce their research costs.H We therefore want to investigate whether a change in specification about research costs will improve the model's predictions about research by insiders.
We begin with a setting in which outsiders are precluded from research; hence, the industry leader acts as a monopolist with respect to the choice of research intensity.
Next we allow for research by outsiders, but at a cost that exceeds that for insiders. We show that the monopoly research outcome applies if the leader's cost advantage in R&D is sufficiently great. Otherwise, the probability of research success coincides with the value from our previous analysis. However, we now predict-in contrast with Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4 )-that the research will be carried out by the (low-cost) insider, rather than the (high-cost) outsiders.
The Leader as a Monopoly Researcher
Suppose that the incumbent's research technology also takes the form of equations (16) and (22): (37) PJ(Z/Q).q I l4Current technological leaders-.companies or countries-are less likely to have a cost advantage for the discovery of entirely new products. See Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) for this argument.
• f(1-) exp(-p. r). dr = (wj-Z.)/(r+p.)
The second part of E(Vj,ç) covers the period after the time of the next quality improvement, T.,. The expected present value starting from that date is E(V.
), ii j+1 but we have to discount this term by the factor exP(__rTJK). Therefore, if we again use the probability density for Tj,ç from equation (18), then we can evaluate this second part as E(VjK) PJ ferT.exp(_pr) dr = P• If we combine the two parts, then we get The result in equation (39) differs from the free-entry condition in the previous setup in equation [20] ) in two respects. First, the term Z/p is now equated to the increment in present value, E(V ic+i -
E(V)
rather than to the full j 3 present value, E(Vj,c.+i)i because the leader does not value the expropriation of his or her own monopoly profit. Second, the term E(Vj,ç) is calculated differently from before, because it considers that the leadership position is permanent, rather than temporary.
To see this last property, substitute the result for E(V•,ç ) from equation (39) j+1 into equation (38) and also substitute for from equation (37) to get (40) EN.) = r/r.
The term on the right-hand side is the present value yielded by a permanent stream of profit of size lrj,ç. (Since the stream is permanent, the discount rate is r, rather than r+p..)
If we substitute from equation (40) into equation (39) and use equation (14) to substitute out for r, then we get a condition for r. The resulting value, denoted r1, is the equilibrium rate of return for an environment in which the research in all sectors is carried out by the industry leader:'5 15ff rcrt where r1 is given in equation (41), then the derivative of E(V) with respect to
The corresponding growth rate (of Q and the other quantities) is given, as usual, by
The rate of return in the previous model satisfies the condition (from equation
1= (L/g.A1/U_a).(i?).a2/(1_a)
This expression includes p on the right-hand side, although we could also substitute the equilibrium value for p from equation (36). The result for r1 in equation (41) differs from the solution for r in equation (42) in three ways. First) Q ( tends to make rfr.
Second, r falls with p in equation (42) because the private return to an innovation is temporary. This force tends to make rtr. Finally, equation (41) includes the term [l_c_a/(1_a)I<l, because the leader weighs only the increment in present value from a research success. This term tends to make r1cr.
If we use equation (36) to substitute out lot p in equation (42), then we get the equilibrium value for r, as expressed in equation (34).
Q=(
so that the leader has no cost advantage in research, then we can use equatiâns (41) and (34) to show r1Cr.16 The difference between the rates of return involves two offsetting forces: r1<r because no weight is given to the expropriaticn of the existing monopoly rentals, but r1>r because p is positive, so that the leader would like to carry out an infinite amount of research. If J r>rt then the derivative is negative, so that no research is carried out, and the economydoes not grow. An equilibrium with positive growth therefore requires r=rt '6The proof requires the transversality condition, r>, given in n. 12.
innovations are viewed as permanent. The net effect is unambiguous because the two forces are essentially the same, except that they differ in sign and one comes earlier than the other. The extraction of the monopoly rent is the amount taken from one's predecessor. The treatment of an innovation as temporary is equivalent to ignoring the rents that will be taken by one's followers. The terms are the same in magnitude, except for two considerations: the later term is higher because of growth of the economy at the rate 7, but is smaller in present value because of discounting at the rate r. The relation r>-the transversality condition-implies that the first term dominates, so that r1'zr must hold.
Research by Outsiders
Suppose now that we allow outside competitors, as well as the leader, to carry out research. If C=Q, then equations (41) and (34) imply r1cr, that is, outsiders view research more favorably than the leader. The probability of success, p, and the expected growth rate of quality in each sector are therefore higher than the values that would be determined by a leader who had exclusive rights to do research.
These results do not mean that all research will be conducted by outsiders. Given the competitors' willingness to carry out enough research to generate a probability of success p, the •leader would have to accept this probability of an innovation as a constraint given by the existence of the outside competition. (The constraint is effective here because leaders would otherwise determine a lower probability.) For a given success probability-and, hence, a given expected duration of the currently leading technology-the rate of return from research for the leader is exactly the same as that for outsiders (when (=Q). Although the leader does not consider the extraction of the existing monopoly rentals as part of the return from successful research, he or she does count as a return the prevention of the loss of these rentals to an outsider. Thus, when
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(=Q the solutions that we obtained before are valid-for r in equation (34), i in equation (35), and p in equation (36)-but it is a matter of indifference whether the research is done by leaders or outsiders.'7
Now we make the more realistic assumption Qc(, that is, incumbents have a cost advantage in improving and refining the existing types of products. We noted before that r1cr applies when but equation (41) shows that a reduction in Q raises
There exists a critical value (such that (c( implies r1>r. If the leader's cost advantage in research in each sector is large enough so that (g<(, then the existence of the outside competition does not constrain the incumbent's choice of research intensity.
Hence, Qc( implies that the equilibrium rate of return equals the valuer1 shown in equation (41), and the growth rate is given correspondingly by -y(1/O).(r1_p).Is Note that the computations that underlie these solutions for r1 and treat innovations as permanent and do not attach any value to the taking of the existing monopoly rentals.
Consider now the range (cQc(. In this case, the cost advantage for leaders is not sufficient to ignore the outside competition. The equilibrium is then an analog to limit pricing-research intensities and the corresponding probability of success are just sufficient to deter outsiders from entering the research business. In particular, the limit success probability is the value p shown in equation ( l?This statement is correct if monopoly pricing prevails in either case. LSThis equilibrium determines the aggregate spending on R&D and the economy's overall growth rate. The allocation of R&D across the sectors is indeterminate however, because all rates of return to research by leaders equal r1 and are independent of the amount invested. See n. 7 for an analogous indeterminacy in the model in which outsiders carry out all of the research.
tOThe only difference from before is that the amount spent on research, Z, is smaller because it depends on the research cost for leaders, Q, rather than that for outsiders, (. The level of consumption, C, in equation (33) is correspondingly higher.
Thus, on the one hand, we no longer predict the pattern of leapfrogging in which every innovation goes along with the replacement of the industry leader by an outsider.
But, on the other hand, the values of r and #y are the same as those predicted by the leapfrogging model. The results are as if researchers were seeking the incumbent's rentals and anticipating that their successes would only be temporary.
Another result in the range where is that the existence of the competitive fringe for research is important for the equilibrium. Research intensity and the economy's growth rate are higher than they would be if this fringe did not exist (because r1cr applies in this range). intermediates, X; and R&D effort, Z.
The planner's problem is also constrained by the R&D technology. We assume that the probability of a research success in sector j, which has attained the quality rung is again given from equation (37) by (37) Pj/ç=(1/Q).Zj-
We enter the leader's research cost, Q, which we assume is no larger than the cost for outsiders, because the social planner would assign the research activity to the low-cost researcher.
It is convenient first to work out the planner's choice of X.,-which is a static JJ problem-and then use the result to write out a simplified Harniltonian expression. We can show that the first-order condition for maximizing U with respect to the choice of X implies (44) X (social planner) = LAh/_4.ah/(1_Q).qJ/().
Recall that the choice in a decentralized economy is (6) X-= LAh1(14.a21(1_a).q3). 
Substitution for p from equation (37) simplifies the expressioa to (46) E(AQ) = Thus, the expected change in Q-and, hence, in Y-depends only on the aggregate of R&D spending, Z, and not on the manner in which this spending is spread across the sectors. We again assume that the number of sectors is large enough so that we can treat Q as differentiable;, hence, we use equation (46) to represent the actual change, Q.
We can use the results to write the social-planner's Uamiltonian expression as - 20This indeterminacy reflects the lack of diminishing returns to research in each sector. This kind of indeterminacy also applied in the decentralized frameworks; see n. 7 and n. is.
The implicit social rate of return1 which corresponds to the expression in the large brackets that precedes the term -p, is therefore The rate of return r1 prevails in the decentralized economy if leaders have a sufficient cost advantage in research (Q<C in the previous discussion). Otherwise, the rate of return is the value r shown in equation (34) . The spread between the social rate of return and r adds rrr to the gap between the social rate and r, a gap that we have already discussed.
Recall that r1cr because of two offsetting effects: the rate r is higher because it counts the expropriation of the predecessor's monopoly profit, but is lower because it views the benefits from an innovation as temporary. We discussed before why the first effect was larger, so that r1cr on net. This result implies that the difference between the social rate of return and r is smaller than the difference between the social rate and rt Hence, the gap between the planner's and decentralized growth rates is also not as large as before. It is even possible that the privately determined rate of return and growth rate would exceed the planner's values. This result applies if the effect from the monopoly pricing of the intermediates is less important than the gap between r and r1 (which reflects the net effect from the seeking of monopoly profit).
We already mentioned that the appropriate subsidy to the purchase of intermediates would remove the distortions from monopoly pricing. The additional distortions that arise when the private rate of return is r (given in equation [34] ) can be eliminated if a scheme is implemented-in the spirit of Coase (1.960)-that effectively endows industry leaders with property rights over their monopoly profits. This scheme would require innovators to compensate their immediate predecessor for the loss of rental income. An innovator in sector j then raises the cost of innovation to include the required compensation to the current leader, but also raises the prospective reward to include the anticipated compensation from the next innovator. The first part of the scheme causes the innovator to count only the net change in the flow of monopoly rentals as a contribution; that is, the incentive to seek the existing rents is eliminated.
The second part motivates the innovator to view his or her contribution as lasting forever, rather than just until the next innovation. As usual, however, the successful implementation of this kind of policy becomes problematic in a richer model; for example, in contexts where quality improvements are hard for a policymaker to evaluate.
The internalization just described occurs automatically in the model if the leaders have a monopoly position in research so that the private rate of return is the value rt Thus, one way to reach the first best in this framework is to preclude research by outsiders! This provision reduces the incentive to innovate, but only to the appropriate extent. This method works, however, only if the effects of monopoly pricing have already been neutralized through the appropriate tax.subsidy policy. If these taxsubsidy policies are infeasible, then the prevention of research by followers is likely to worsen the outcomes in this model.
We can summarize the model's conclusions about welfare as follows:
1.
The decentralized rate of return and growth rate coincide with the socialplanner's choices if the effects of monopoly pricing are eliminated (for example, by implementing the appropriate subsidy to the purchase of intermediates) and if innovators are forced to compensate their immediate predecessor for the loss of monopoly rentals. This compensation scheme effectively institutes the claim on these monopoly rentals as a formal property right.
2.
If the effects of monopoly pricingare eliminated, bat no compensation is awarded to predecessors, then the decentralized values for the rate of return and the growth rate exceed the social-planner's values. The failure to compensate one's predecessor makes the private rewards to innovation too high, whereas the failure to receive compensation later goes the other way.
The net effect from this tent seeking is unambiguous, however, because the distortions are essentially the same, except that the second one occurs later.
3.
If there are no interventions-so that the effects of monopoly pricing are not eliminated and no compensation is paid to one's predecessor-then the decentralized values for the rate of return and the growth rate may be higher or lower than the social-planner's values. Monopoly pricing causes the decentralized rate of return and growth rate to fall short of the socially optimal values, but this effect is offset by the net effect from rent seeking,, a force that makes the private rate of return too high.
F. Summary Observations about Growth
The quality improvements studied in this paper represent ongoing refinements of products and techniques, whereas the expansions of variety considered in other models describe basic innovations. From a modeling standpoint, one distinction between the two kinds of technological progress is that goods of higher quality are close substitutes for those of lesser quality, so that quality enhancements tend to make the old goods obsolete. In contrast, discoveries of new kinds of products may not, on average, be direct substitutes or complements for the existing types. Therefore, basic innovations may not drive out the old varieties. One consequence of this distinction is that, in a decentralized economy, the R&D effort aimed at quality improvements may be too high (because of the incentive to seek the monopoly rents of incumbents), whereas the effort aimed at basic innovations tends to be too low.
Another difference from the varieties models is that the costs of quality improvements for insiders tend to be smaller than those for outsiders. Hence, we argued that the insiders would tend, in equilibrium, to carry out the research that underlies the regular process of product refinement. In contrast, insiders are unlikely to have a cost advantage in breakthrough research; basically because there are no insiders for this activity. Therefore, dramatically new innovations are unlikely to come from existing industry leaders.
Thetwo types of technological progress have similar predictions about the determination of growth rates. In both cases, growth is higher if the willingness to save is greater, the level of technology is higher, and the cost of R&D is lower. Both formulations also predict scale effects, represented in the models by the quantity of a fixed factor like raw labor or human capital. 
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